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Territorial Claims in the Domain of
Accidental Harm
CONFLICTING CONCEPTIONS OF TORT PREEMPTION
Robert L. Rabin†
Territorial claims in the domain of accident law have a long and
tortuous history. Criticism of tort as systematically failing to adequately
compensate industrial injury victims led to a workers’ compensation
movement in the Progressive era that literally swept the tort system
aside, clearing the playing field for state-by-state no-fault compensation
based on legislative/administrative benefits in place of tort adjudication.1
Some fifty years later, in the late 1960s, a similarly-grounded concern
about inadequate compensation animated the auto no-fault movement
that complemented, and in some states partially replaced tort with yet
another system of legislatively-designated benefits for the victims of
motor vehicle accidents.2
Then, in the mid-1970s, the tide turned. The focal point of
institutional criticism of the tort system shifted dramatically from claims
of under-compensation of injury victims to a perception that the system
was overly generous (and unpredictably so).3 Nonetheless, for the better
part of the next twenty years, one school of tort critics leveled their
attacks at the internal dynamics of the tort system, pressing for legislative
limitations on punitive damages, pain and suffering awards, and other
remedial measures through caps and related stratagems.4 The reform
efforts were incremental rather than territorial; that is, displacement of
tort was not a priority agenda item.

†

A. Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Many thanks to Peter
Schuck, Catherine Sharkey, and Stephen Sugarman for helpful suggestions, and to Sai Jahann for
valuable research assistance.
1
See MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW SOCIETY: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN AMERICA 197-215 (1994); Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and
the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50 (1967).
2
The movement was animated by the Keeton-O’Connell plan. See ROBERT E. KEETON
& JEFFREY O’CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965).
3
An early milestone enactment was the California Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (“MICRA”) in 1975 addressing claims by the medical profession of excessive tort
awards against physicians. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2009).
4
For discussion of the reform initiatives, see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, “Off to the
Races”: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207 (1990).
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A more foundational critique emerged initially in the academic
literature, in considerable part as a rejoinder to the expanding doctrinal
reach of products liability law—with particular emphasis on the complex
science and technology that was often critical to determining the
outcome in defective design and warning cases.5 Critics posed the
question of whether courts were up to the job with a negative rejoinder in
mind. Juries, they asserted, could not weigh in a satisfying fashion the
risk/benefit issues central to these cases, when compared to expert
agencies.6
Much of the early criticism came in the guise of proposals that
courts recognize a regulatory compliance defense and defer to regulatory
determinations in cases of conflicting territorial claims to
decisionmaking authority.7 Thus, a prominent critic of the institutional
competence of the tort system put his critique this way:
[J]udicial nondeference may make some sense when the administrative
regulatory regime is casual or sporadic, as with consumer products. But it is
wholly unpersuasive for comprehensively regulated industries. Vaccines,
pesticides, aircraft, electric power plants and the like all entail potentially
enormous mass-exposure hazards. Precisely because they can create public
risks of this nature, these products and services are also subject to the most
searching and complete state and federal safety regulation. Administrative
agencies may find it politically convenient to disclaim final responsibility for
the public risk choices that inhere in such licensing decisions. But the simple
fact is that an agency cannot intelligently issue a license for such public-risk
activities without comparing the licensee’s risks to those of the competition and
determining that the new offering represents some measure of progress or, at
worst, no measure of regression in the risk market in question.
Once that determination has been made by an expert licensing agency, the
courts should respect it. Regulatory agencies are equipped to make the risk
comparisons on which all progressive transformation of the risk environment
must be based. The courts are simply not qualified to second-guess such
decisions; when they choose to do so they routinely make regressive risk
choices. Requiring—or at least strongly encouraging—the courts to respect the
comparative risk choices made by competent, expert agencies would inject a
first, small measure of rationality into a judicial regulatory system that
currently runs quite wild.8

5

See, e.g., Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985). For Huber’s mass-audience versions of
the critique, see PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1990); PETER HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1993); see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980).
6
For a recent version of the critique, see Peter Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort
Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73 (2008).
7
See AM. LAW INST., REPORTER’S STUDY, 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY 83-110 (1991); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort
Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000).
8
Huber, supra note 5, at 334-35.
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For a variety of reasons, the regulatory compliance defense never
gained a firm foothold in the state courts.9 Only one state, Michigan,
affords it full recognition (by way of legislation); a handful of other
states treat it as a bar to punitive damages.10 Both the Products Liability
Restatement and the Restatement of the Law Third Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm, give it only non-determinative “some
evidence” status, reflecting the view of most states courts.11
Meanwhile, however, a far more formidable challenge to the
territorial claims of tort has arisen. Beginning in 1992, with the landmark
decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,12 the U.S. Supreme Court
has decided a burgeoning number of preemption cases, squarely
challenging the continuing vitality of tort in many domains of accident
law.13 As I will indicate, Cipollone addressed the preemption question in
an atypical context. The case did not involve competing claims to
territorial authority between a regulatory regime and state tort law;
rather, Cipollone involved a challenge to the continuing viability of tort
in the face of statutory directives mandating explicit industry conduct.14
9

For discussion of the reasons, see Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory
Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
10
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946 (2000) (codifying the regulatory compliance
defense). For a recent review of the status of the regulatory compliance defense in state law, see Carl
Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1026-27 nn. 158-61
(2008).
11
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 (1998) (“In connection with
liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or warnings: . . . (b) a product’s compliance
with an applicable product safety statute or administrative regulation is properly considered in
determining whether the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the
statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product
defect.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13 cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[I]n products liability cases, despite the quasi-contractual
relationship between the consumer and the manufacturer, the latter’s compliance with custom in
designing its product is only some evidence of the adequacy of the product’s design.”).
12
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
13
The principal Supreme Court decisions addressing preclusion in tort after Cipollone
are Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), discussed infra Part II, Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000), discussed infra Part II, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (preempting a stand-alone claim of fraud on the FDA in the approval
process of a manufacturer’s orthopedic bone screws under the Medical Device Amendments),
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002) (holding that neither the Federal Boat Safety Act
nor the Coast Guard’s decision not to promulgate specific regulations preempted plaintiff’s state
common law claim that her boat motor was unreasonably dangerous), Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (refusing to preempt a claim of inadequate warning under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act after finding no inconsistency with the agency-approved
warning), Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008), discussed infra notes 43-45, Altria
Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008), discussed infra Part III.B, and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.
Ct. 1187 (2009), discussed infra Part III.
14
The 1969 version of the cigarette labeling act, reviewed in Cipollone, required four
explicit warnings to be used on a rotating basis: (1) “Surgeon General’s Warning: Smoking Causes
Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy”; (2) “Surgeon
General’s Warning: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious Risks to Your Health”; (3)
“Surgeon General’s Warning: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature
Birth, and Low Birth Weight”; (4) “Surgeon General’s Warning: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.” Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 87
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000)).
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As one moves beyond Cipollone to the far more common
situations in which it is agency regulatory directives, rather than statutory
warning language that arguably preempt tort law, it is critical to keep the
institutional competence question in proper constitutional perspective.
Preemption cases do not raise a question for free-standing judicial
determination of whether agencies are better constituted to impose
optimal standards of industry conduct than courts. That is a question of
common law deference raised by the regulatory compliance defense; it is
not the question posed by a claim of preemption. In preemption cases,
whatever the frustration engendered by the difficulties in discerning
legislative intent, the question under the Supremacy Clause is
inescapably whether Congress intended to displace tort law.15
In Part I of this article, I will revisit Cipollone to reassess what it
has to offer as a foundation for setting the boundaries of regulatory
containment of the tort system. Then, in Part II, I will discuss three
leading cases from the series of efforts by the Supreme Court to grapple
with express preemption clauses in a variety of regulatory schemes.16
Against this backdrop, in Part III, I will discuss the circumstances under
which it might be justified to imply preemption despite the absence of an
express provision.17 A concluding note will tie the strands together.
I.

CIPOLLONE REVISITED

Forty years of tobacco litigation came to a crossroads in
Cipollone. The tobacco industry defendants, looking for a knockout
punch to eliminate a continuing barrage of claims by smoking victims of
failure to adequately warn, argued successfully for preemption of these
tort suits based on language in the cigarette package warning label
legislation.18 The amended version of that legislation contained a
preemption provision, which read: “No requirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to
the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act.”19
15

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (The Supremacy Clause provides that the laws of the United
States “shall be the supreme law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). For a recent reassertion of this point, see Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 543
(“Our inquiry into the scope of a statute’s pre-emptive effect is guided by the rule that ‘[t]he purpose
of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”).
16
The three leading cases I will discuss are Lohr, Riegel, and Geier, cited supra note 13.
17
In particular, I will discuss the recently decided Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(2009), addressing preemption in the context of prescription drug regulation.
18
The Court was sharply split: Justice Stevens wrote for a four-justice plurality, holding
that the 1969 Act preempted failure to warn claims but not claims based on fraudulent concealment
of material facts (or express warranties); Justice Blackmun wrote for three justices who rejected the
displacement of common law tort claims; Justices Scalia and Thomas would have preempted
categorically.
19
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (2000)) (emphasis added).
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Cipollone has been taken to be the foundational case on express
preemption and in particular on the preclusion of common law tort
through the reading of tort duties as “requirements.”20 In fact, Cipollone
provided a questionable foundation for any broad equation of tort duties
with “requirements.” As recently as Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,21 decided
in the 2007-08 Term of the Court, Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent, in
a case involving the preemption provision in the Medical Devices
Amendments, that Congress could have meant “requirements” as
precluding only state regulatory schemes imposing requirements beyond
federal standards.22
The key to this continuing skepticism is straightforward. Tort
duties do not “require” anything other than the payment of damages. If
tort liability does lead a defendant to a private assessment in favor of
greater future precautionary measures, then tort, of course, has had a
regulatory effect.23 But tort itself dictates no particular change in a losing
defendant’s conduct.24 Indeed, under a strict liability regime, tort imposes
liability with total indifference to whether a defendant might reasonably
have decided against investing in additional safety. High priority is given
to compensating injury victims and/or risk-spreading.25
But the Cipollone plurality did not meet the challenge head-on.
Rather, the plurality’s pivotal point was statutory construction of the
cigarette labeling act: that the changed wording in the 1969 preemption
provision—statutory language that prohibited conflicting “requirements”
20

Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521-22 (1992).
128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
22
Id. at 1013-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
544 U.S. 431, 443 (2005) (“An occurrence that merely motivates an optional decision does not
qualify as a requirement. The Court of Appeals was therefore quite wrong when it assumed that any
event, such as a jury verdict, that might ‘induce’ a pesticide manufacturer to change its label should
be viewed as a requirement.”); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002) (“The contrast
between [the savings clause’s] general reference to ‘liability at common law’ and the more specific
and detailed description of what is pre-empted by [the express preemption clause] indicates that [the
preemption clause] was drafted to preempt performance standards and equipment requirements
imposed by statute or regulation.”).
23
Tort as a regulatory regime has come to great prominence in the academic literature.
For general discussion, see John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513,
513-17 (2003). For advocacy of viewing tort from a regulatory perspective in the context of
preemption, see Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A Critique of
Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. art. 5 (2006); Schuck, supra
note 6.
24
Justice Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part, made this point forcefully
in Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 535-39. In fact, the same is often true of regulatory requirements: a violator
who is willing to pay the penalty can ignore compliance. In general, however, the normative
implications are quite different.
25
In this regard, see Justice Traynor’s landmark concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (“Those who suffer injury from defective
products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or
health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.”). For articulation of this position in the context of rejecting a regulatory compliance
defense claim, see Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Company, 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
21
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rather than just “statements” (the 1965 statutory terminology)—
suggested a more expansive intent than the earlier limitation to
conflicting state regulatory measures.26 Even so, the Cipollone plurality
did not proscribe all tort litigation. Instead, it read the preemption
provision narrowly to leave open the prospect of claims for fraud and
misrepresentation against the tobacco companies.27 Indeed, in a nice bit
of irony, tort claimants began to realize a measure of success for the first
time immediately after Cipollone, as plaintiffs relied on the nearly
contemporaneous discovery of tobacco industry documents revealing a
pattern of deceptive practices by the industry as a foundation for nonpreempted tort claims.28
What can be taken from Cipollone that might be useful in
providing broader guidance when regulatory agency directives are
satisfied but injury victims nonetheless argue for liability in tort? It
seems sensible to think that when Congress enacted, and then
subsequently refined, specific cautionary language required on cigarette
package labels, it did not mean to have that very process and outcome reopened in another forum through tort claims of failure to adequately
warn. This is the core meaning of so-called “conflict” preemption, and it
seems questionable—in the absence of an explicit savings clause—to
read Congress as desiring, in effect, penalties on compliance, even in the
guise of compensation.29
26

The 1965 statute’s preemption clause stated: “(a) No statement relating to smoking
and health, other than the statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any
cigarette package; (b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of
this Act.” Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5 (1965)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000)) (emphasis added).
27
This issue resurfaced before the Supreme Court in Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129
S.Ct. 538 (2008), when the defendant tobacco company sought to interpose a preemption defense to
plaintiff’s claim of economic harm from purchasing “light” cigarettes under the supposition that
there would be less nicotine and tar intake. Defendant argued that this was a health and safety claim
barred by the proscription of requirements exceeding the statutorily-prescribed warning label. A
majority of the Court (5-4) disagreed, holding that the claim was one of fraud in violation of the state
consumer protection law, rather than one based on health and safety. Altria is discussed further in
Part III.B.
28
See Robert L. Rabin, The Third Wave of Tobacco Tort Litigation, in REGULATING
TOBACCO ch. 7 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
29
This is a closer question than most proponents of preemption acknowledge, precisely
because the well-established tradition of strict liability in tort poses a federalism challenge to conflict
preemption—short of expressly-stated preclusion of tort. Thus, Professor Stephen Sugarman points
out that compensation is a dominant concern reflected in state tort law and that there is no reason to
think that federal regulatory legislation is indifferent to that concern—i.e., would be designed to
extinguish it via preemption—unless there is explicit indication of that intent in the regulatory
legislation. Moreover, the uniformity interest, offered as one justification for conflict preemption,
does not override that concern because tort does not compromise uniformity; tort requires nothing
beyond the payment of damages. E-mail from Stephen Sugarman to Robert Rabin (Sept. 29, 2008)
(on file with author); E-mail from Stephen Sugarman to Robert Rabin (Sept. 30, 2008) (on file with
author); E-mail from Stephen Sugarman to Robert Rabin (Jan. 8, 2009) (on file with author).
In response, Professor Peter Schuck argues
One simply cannot separate the compensation and regulatory issues without affecting
drug manufacturer incentives in ways that are difficult to predict and that involve the
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In the final analysis, there are competing considerations in
resolving these preemption claims. On the one hand, it is beyond
argument that Congress could limit preemption to conventional
legislative and regulatory guidelines: Congress might recognize that tort
plays a distinctive role in providing compensation to victims who suffer
harm despite regulatory compliance. A regulatory regime like the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) provides no remedy to those who are
injured despite compliance with regulatory directives. Correlatively,
there is no inexorable principle that productivity gains from uniform
national health and safety standards—a frequently invoked rationale for
preemption—should be borne by injury victims in cases of residual
harm. Moreover, once again, it is critical to underscore the dynamics of
tort. Liability does not entail enforced departure from regulatory
standards; it only compels payment of damage awards.30
highest social stakes. The prospect of having to pay compensation under a strict liability
rule, especially one not subject to a state-of-the-art defense, would surely increase the
already large uncertainty that surrounds manufacturers’ large long-term investments that
are necessary in order to develop socially valuable pharmaceutical products. It might also
cause risk-averse manufacturers to include more in their labeling than would be optimal
for consumers.
Schuck, supra note 6, at 101 n.114.
But this argument does not seem entirely responsive. For one thing, it is detached from
reading preemption with congressional intent as the focal point. Congress knows how to create
statutory immunity from tort law when it is concerned about the welfare of an industry. See e.g.,
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92 (2005) (eliminating liability of
gun manufacturers and sellers when guns are used in criminal or illegal activities to harm third
persons). And for another, it rests entirely on empirical assumptions about consequential effects on
industry investment decisions that are not well-documented. Indeed, Schuck rests his argument in
this regard on a single citation to a newspaper article, Stephanie Saul, Bristol-Myers to Eliminate
4,800 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES Dec. 6, 2007, at C1, discussing the decline in approvals of new drug
formulations between 2006-07. See Schuck, supra note 6 at 78 n.21. The Saul article makes no
mention of tort liability as an explanation for job elimination. To the contrary, it references
“[g]eneric competition, a dearth of new drugs and a more safety-conscious posture by the [FDA]” as
factors explaining industry-wide layoffs. The article goes on to note that Bristol-Myers “is facing the
same problem as many of the other drug-makers: the looming loss of patent protection for an
important drug.” Saul, supra. For further skepticism about the empirical assumptions, see Michelle
M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Legal Concerns and the Influenza Vaccine Shortage, 294 JAMA
1817 (2005) (addressing the contraction of the vaccine suppliers’ market).
In the final analysis, one must discern congressional intent without clear guidance. But
as I develop in the text, infra, the often-ignored compensation goal of tort, which has been prominent
in the background when Congress has enacted regulatory legislation, provides a compelling basis for
reading conflict preemption narrowly. See David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical
Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008).
30
In addition, Kessler and Vladeck emphasize the distinctive, searching nature of the tort
discovery process even when compared to the new drug approval protocol: “The informationgathering tools lawyers have in litigation are, by any measure, more extensive than the FDA’s.
Indeed, the FDCA does not give the FDA the most important tool trial lawyers have—the right to
subpoena relevant information from any source.” Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 491. But of
course, there is a trade-off between the regulatory process that brings disciplined expertise to its
review process, incorporating risk/risk analysis, and the determination by a lay jury in an adversarial
process focused on the particulars of a plaintiff’s injury.
These strong, federalism-grounded arguments for taking a cautionary approach to
displacing tort have, at times, led the Supreme Court to refer to a “presumption against preemption.”
For the most recent example, see the majority opinion in Wyeth. 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 n.3 (2009).
But as Professor Sharkey has argued, the Court has shown no consistency in invoking the
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On the other hand, it is similarly clear that Congress can
preclude recourse to tort if it chooses to do so. Immunity from liability
for accidental harm is not an unknown proposition, and in addition to the
benefits from nationally uniform health and safety standards, there is the
institutional competence argument for making regulatory standards
determinative: in the recent context of Riegel v. Medtronic, that the FDA
has far greater expertise than juries in deciding optimal design and
warning standards for medical devices.31
If Cipollone is a good starting point in highlighting these crosscutting considerations, a more focused exploration of the parameters of
preemption requires discussion of the Supreme Court’s subsequent
efforts to forge a sensible pathway through the conflicting territorial
claims of federal regulatory agencies and state tort law.
II.

BEYOND CIPOLLONE: THREE LEADING CASES

Nearly two decades have passed since the Cipollone venture into
the domain of tort. In the ensuing years, the Supreme Court has had
numerous occasions to demarcate the boundaries of preemption with
greater precision.32 Since every such effort has entailed a contextualized
exercise in discerning Congressional intent, it is perhaps not surprising
that commentators find little guidance in the Court’s performance.33 In
my view, however, by focusing on a limited number of recent decisions,
it is possible to point the way to a sensible working principle for
resolving the tension between regulation and tort generated by
preemption claims.
I begin with the Medical Devices Amendments to the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (MDA), which authorized FDA approval of new
medical devices prior to marketing.34 In establishing the regulatory
regime, Congress enacted an express preemption provision that has
provided the Supreme Court with two opportunities—roughly a decade
apart—to weigh in on the preclusive effect of the statute on tort claims.35
presumption. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 455-59 (2008). In my view, invoking the presumption (or ignoring it)
is of no operational consequence.
31
See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008); see also discussion of Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc., infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
32
See cases cited supra note 13.
33
See, e.g., Sharkey, supra note 30, at 459-71 (“The Supreme Court’s preemption
jurisprudence reflects an incoherent, and at times internally inconsistent, conception of the tortregulation pas-à-deux. . . . The Court has oscillated between competing conceptions of tort as either
primarily regulatory or compensatory, with the regulatory view justifying preemptive results and the
compensatory view compelling the opposite.”).
34
Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 21 U.S.C. § 360(e) (2006).
35
The Medical Devices Act preemption provision, reads as follows:
[N]o State . . . may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for
human use any requirement—
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In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,36 the Court interpreted the MDA in a fashion
that left tort claims undisturbed.37 Ruling to the contrary in Riegel v.
Medtronic, Inc.,38 the Court rejected a tort suit under the same
preemption provision.39 Despite these contrasting holdings, the
Lohr/Riegel tandem offers a useful perspective on what should be the
critical factor in determining conflict preemption, as I see it: an analysis
of whether the agency directive was grounded in the same evidencebased risk/benefit inquiry as the tort process would entail.
In Lohr, the plaintiff’s defective design claim was based on
injury from the malfunctioning of a pacemaker inserted to correct a
cardiac irregularity.40 The FDA had approved the device under the
“substantial equivalence” provisions of the Amendments, a fast-track
system under which new devices that appeared to be substantially similar
to medical devices already on the market could be certified without
independent testing of the product.41 There was, in other words, no
evidence-based risk/benefit inquiry by the FDA, focused on the precise
design of the defendant’s pacemaker; hence, there was no basis for a
claim that the tort suit would be going over the same ground as the
regulatory process. As a consequence, a comparative institutional
competence claim for displacing a tort suit seemed unwarranted.42
Riegel provides a counterpoint to Lohr that brings home the
essential point. Plaintiff’s design defect claim in Riegel was based on the
rupturing of a balloon catheter, manufactured by defendant, during an
angioplasty procedure.43 The device had been cleared for marketing in
the FDA’s product-specific pre-market approval process, not via the fast(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this
chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
Id. at 360k(a).
36
518 U.S. 470 (1996).
37
Id. at 503.
38
128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
39
Id. at 1006, 1011.
40
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 480-81. In both Lohr and Reigel, the Court characterizes the claims
as design defects, rather than manufacturing defects (that is, departures from the intended design).
Id. at 483. See generally Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999 ( discussing design requirements to which medical
devices are subjected in the approval process). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.,
§§ 2(a), 2(b) (1998). There is general agreement that tort claims based on injuries from
manufacturing defects, which are departures from the approved product, are not preempted.
41
21 U.S.C. § 360(c)(f)(1) (2006).
42
But might not the “substantial equivalence” determination be grounded in full-scale
premarket approval of the earlier product? This remote possibility that the new product tracks the old
in all material particulars, and that nothing substantial has occurred in the risk universe in the
intervening time, is further put to rest in U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09190, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THAT HIGH-RISK DEVICE TYPES
ARE APPROVED THROUGH THE MOST STRINGENT PREMARKET REVIEW PROCESS (2009), a highly
critical review of the “substantial equivalence” process. See also Gardiner Harris, In F.D.A. Files,
Claims of Rush to Approve Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 13, 2009, at A14.
43
Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005 (majority opinion).
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track “substantial equivalence” process relied on in Lohr.44 Contra to
Lohr, the Court preempted state tort claims, emphasizing that “premarket
approval is specific to individual devices,” and referring to the
substantial equivalence process in Lohr as an exemption rather than fullscale safety review.45
A third leading case, Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.46
offered a refinement that contributed to identifying the pathway for
future territorial limitations on the tort domain. Geier, which involved
interposition of a preemption defense under the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act,47 posed a not uncommon obstacle to
conventional preemption analysis: the Act on its face appeared to
equivocate on the displacement of state tort law (if not rejecting
displacement entirely) by providing a “saving” clause—to the effect that
“[c]ompliance with [a federal safety standard] does not exempt any
person from any liability under common law.”48 At the same time, the
Act contained an express preemption provision for regulatory safety
standards.49
Plaintiff sued in tort on a design defect theory, arguing that his
injuries were enhanced by the absence of a driver’s side airbag;
defendant responded by asserting a preemption defense based on a safety
standard adopted by the DOT that allowed for the phasing in of air bags
over time.50 At trial, defendant introduced testimony on technical
feasibility, cost considerations, and consumer acceptance concerns that
led the agency to opt for a graduated approach to the mandating of air
bags.51
But how was the Court to reconcile the seeming ambiguity
created by both preemption and saving clauses appearing in the same
44

Id. at 1006.
Id. at 1007. A caveat, however, will be relevant to my further discussion. Justice Scalia
nowhere in the opinion mentions victim compensation as a complementary goal that Congress might
also have in mind, along with risk-benefit considerations, in enacting regulatory legislation. Indeed,
he refers to the possible reading of preemption as extending only to state regulatory activity, but not
state tort law, as a “perverse distinction.” Id. at 1008. But the distinction is only perverse if one
totally ignores the fact that state regulatory law offers nothing by way of compensation to accident
victims, unlike tort law, which does double-duty in promoting both regulatory and compensation
objectives. See also infra note 56.
46
529 U.S. 861 (2000).
47
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 15 U.S.C. § 1381
(1988).
48
Id. § 1397(k).
49
Id. § 1392(d) (“Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under
this subchapter is in effect, no State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either
to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle
equipment any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of such vehicle or item
of equipment which is not identical to the Federal standard.”). Note that in this preemption clause, it
is not a “requirement” that is equated with tort liability, but a “safety standard.” Geier, 529 U.S. at
871.
50
Geier, 529 U.S. at 865; see Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208; Occupant
Crash Protection, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2003).
51
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 877-78.
45
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regulatory scheme? The Court’s resolution was to read congressional
intent as limiting the saving clause to regulatory directives adopted by
the agency that set a floor on safety, rather than those grounded in
risk/benefit balancing.52 With reference to the air-bag regulation, the
Court regarded no-air-bag tort claims as directly inconsistent with the
optimality of a phased-in scheme of safety enhancement envisioned by
the agency.53
What is perhaps most interesting, however, about the Geier
opinion is that the saving clause compelled the Court to take cognizance
of a broader set of systemic congressional purposes than one finds in the
advocacy of categorical preemption proponents, as well as in later cases
like Riegel, which focus exclusively on tort as a competing regulatory
regime.54 Contrary to this constrained reading of congressional intent,
Justice Breyer remarked that:
[T]he saving clause reflects a congressional determination that occasional
nonuniformity is a small price to pay for a system in which juries not only
create, but also enforce, safety standards, while simultaneously providing
necessary compensation to victims. That policy by itself disfavors pre-emption,
at least some of the time. But we can find nothing in any natural reading of the
two provisions that would favor one set of policies over the other where a juryimposed safety standard actually conflicts with a federal safety standard.55

In my view, there is no reason to think that simply because a
saving clause is not present in a regulatory scheme, Congress has
necessarily turned a blind eye to this concern for tort as a mechanism of
injury compensation—again that is, apart from the situation of “actual
conflict” referred to by Justice Breyer.56
52

Id. at 868.
Id. at 874. The Court makes reference to “frustration-of-purpos[e]” as a rationale for
invoking preemption, id. (alteration in original), and this factor is sometimes treated as an
independent trigger for the defense. But as I see it, frustration of purpose—in Geier and more
generally—is simply one variant in expressing the prospect of directly competing risk/benefit
analysis that is the crux of the test for satisfying conflict preemption.
54
For advocacy of this categorical approach, see Epstein, supra note 23; Schuck, supra
note 6.
55
Geier, 529 U.S. at 871 (emphasis added). Justice Breyer’s concession regarding
congressional sensitivity to the compensation goal can plausibly raise the question of why a saving
clause should not be taken as a legislative expression of intent to limit the preemption clause to
conflicting state regulatory directives. It certainly can be argued that this is a more natural
reconciliation of the preemption and saving clauses than that adopted by the Court, which resolved
the facial conflict by relegating saved tort claims to regulatory directives meant to establish a floor
on safety. Those latter directives would create no conflict with tort claims even without a saving
clause.
56
In response to the Riegel decision, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) remarked,
“Congress never intended that F.D.A. approval would give blanket immunity to manufacturers from
liability for injuries caused by faulty devices,” and Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA) added,
“The Supreme Court’s decision strips consumers of the rights they’ve had for decades. . . . This isn’t
what Congress intended, and we’ll pass legislation as quickly as possible to fix this nonsensical
situation.” Linda Greenhouse, Justices Shield Medical Devices From Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21,
2008, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). These reactions are not conclusive, of course, on
legislative intent, but surely Kennedy and Waxman, leaders in the enactment of the Medical Devices
53
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If a saving clause coupled with a preemption provision poses one
set of interpretive conundrums, what of a regulatory scheme that makes
no explicit reference at all to tort through a preemption clause? Under
some circumstances can a congressional intent to preempt be nonetheless
implied? The following Part will address that question with special
reference to the context of prescription drug regulation by the FDA.
III.

IMPLIED PREEMPTION: PRESCRIPTION DRUG REGULATION AND
BEYOND

The Supreme Court faced its latest challenge in the preemption
arena in Wyeth v. Levine,57 involving the highly-contested question of
preemption in the prescription drug area.58 Critical to the inquiry is that
new prescription drugs are certified for marketing by the FDA under a
different statutory scheme than the Court reviewed in the Lohr/Riegel
tandem involving new medical devices—and it is a statutory scheme that
has no express preemption provision.59 Thus, the case raised a question
of implied preemption in an especially dynamic area of tort litigation.
In Levine, plaintiff’s arm had to be partially amputated after
gangrene set in following a botched injection of the anti-nausea drug,
Phenergan, by a so-called “IV push” procedure (direct injection into a
vein) that mistakenly missed the mark and mixed the drug with arterial
blood. Plaintiff argued inadequate warning of the risk of amputation
associated with the IV push method—the risk that in fact came to
fruition. In response, defendant Wyeth pointed to the explicit language
Amendments (“MDA”), are more privy to congressional deliberations on congressional aims than
Justice Scalia, who concluded his armchair speculation with the comment that
it is implausible that the MDA was meant to “grant greater power (to set state standards
‘different from, or in addition to’ federal standards) to a single state jury than to state
officials acting through state administrative or legislative lawmaking processes.” That
perverse distinction is not required or even suggested by the broad language Congress
chose in the MDA, and we will not turn somersaults to create it.
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 504 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (citation omitted).
That the MDA was intended to grant significant power to a jury is “implausible” only
if one reads the desire to compensate victims, via tort liability, entirely out of the purview of
Congress. While I support the Court’s conclusion in Riegel, where the tort suit would revisit the
regulatory approval process with no claim of changed circumstances, it is quite another matter to
adopt the broader implausibility rationale.
57
Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
58
FDA regulation of prescription drugs is the focus of much of the recent scholarly
commentary on preemption. See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products
Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089 (2007); Epstein, supra note 23; Margaret Gilhooley,
Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, Preemption, and the Drug
Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347 (2008)Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29; Richard A.
Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L., art. 4
(2006); Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products
Liability Claims, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 415 (2008); Schuck, supra note 6.
59
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 301
(2006).
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on the label that warned about the risk of amputation, and further noted
that it had, in fact, sought to revise the warning to re-word the reference
to the risk of amputation, and was instructed by the FDA to retain the
existing warning.60
The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 margin, upheld the Vermont state
court’s damage award, premised on a rejection of the preemption
defense. The majority opinion, however, does not treat the absence of an
express preemption clause as determinative of the outcome. Instead, the
majority places great emphasis on the FDA’s “changes being effected”
(CBE) regulation, which provides that a manufacturer can take the
initiative to strengthen a product risk warning without prior agency
approval when “safe use of the drug product” would warrant such
action.61 Despite evidence of “at least 20 incidents prior to [Levine’s]
injury in which a Phenergan injection resulted in gangrene and an
amputation,”62 Wyeth had not sought—nor had the FDA taken any action
to preclude—a stronger warning.
Hence, in the majority’s view, there was no direct conflict
between plaintiff’s tort claim and the agency’s earlier, now possibly
outdated, approval. Indeed, the majority opinion suggests a sharply
restrictive test for establishing conflict preemption: “absent clear
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change in Phenergan’s
label, we will not conclude that it was impossible for Wyeth to comply
with both federal and state requirements.”63 There is no hint here of the
preemption determination resting on a distinction between express and
implied congressional intent; instead, the dominant theme is consistent
with the redundancy principle that, as I have expressed it, seems
consonant with reconciling tort and regulatory functions.64
60

The warning on the label read in part:

Due to the close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most commonly used for
intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to avoid perivascular
extravasation or inadvertent intra-arterial injection. Reports compatible with inadvertent
intra-arterial injection of Phenergan Injection, usually in conjunction with other drugs
intended for intravenous use, suggest that pain, severe chemical irritation, severe spasm
of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene requiring amputation are likely under such
circumstances. Intravenous injection was intended in all the cases reported but
perivascular extravasation or arterial placement of the needle is now suspect. There is no
proven successful management of this condition after it occurs. . . .
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1192 n.1. Wyeth’s proposed revision was read by the Court as a formatting
change rather than a heightened warning of risk. See id. at 1192 n.5.
61
21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2008).
62
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1197.
63
Id. at 1198.
64
See supra text accompanying notes 39-40. An alternative pathway for determining that
the regulatory directive reflects meaningful consideration of the risk/benefit analysis that would be
undertaken in the tort claim is spelled out in the “agency reference model” proposed by Professor
Sharkey, supra note 30; for more detailed discussion, see her follow-up article, Sharkey, supra note
58. As a prelude to determining the agency directive/tort preemption issue, Sharkey would require
that:
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Moreover, the “implied” preemption characterization of new
drug approvals is not quite as straightforward as commentators suggest.
In fact, the FDCA has an express saving clause that provides: “Nothing
in the amendments . . . shall be construed as invalidating any provision of
State law which would be valid in the absence of such amendments
unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments
and such provisions of State law.”65
Whether one views this provision as a saving clause, or instead
as a narrow preemption clause, depends on the spin that is put on “unless
there is direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such
provision of state law.”66 Whichever characterization is adopted, the key
correlative question is whether the “provision of state law” language is
read, like “requirements” in earlier-discussed cases, as including state
tort awards. Since the Wyeth majority found no direct conflict between
the agency action on Phenergan and a failure to warn claim, there was no
occasion to address this issue.
This narrow reading of conflict preemption, in turn, puts to rest
the broader position taken by the FDA (and defendant in Wyeth) that
agency approval of a new prescription drug categorically displaces later
tort relief for an injury victim.67 This is a salutary development. I see no
courts should look to agencies to supply the empirical data necessary to determine
whether a uniform federal regulatory policy should exist—as agencies are in the best
position to gather and evaluate data—and to make informed choices regarding the
welfare of the American public.
Sharkey, supra note 30, at 452-53.
There is appeal to this judicial “hard-look” position and it certainly would be
beneficial if agencies would follow Sharkey’s lead on their own initiative. But I have three
reservations about the courts imposing the requirement as a judicial initiative as Sharkey proposes.
First, there is no plausible reason to read this stipulation into congressional intent as an intrinsic
feature of the preemption inquiry. Second, the inquiry seems in part to miss the mark. While it would
make a great deal of sense to have the agencies submit findings to support their risk/benefit analysis
because that goes directly to the issue of comparative institutional competence, which is the central
determinant (and rationale) for conflict preemption, I fail to see what expertise the agency has to
supply in predicting the value of uniformity, which is not an element of the agency protocol for
regulatory approval. Finally, I am concerned that imposing this requirement on the agencies would
be an invitation to ex post rationalization (i.e., building a paper record after the fact).
Having expressed these reservations, I would emphasize that Sharkey’s proposal is in part
meant to focus the preemption inquiry precisely in the right direction, as I see it. See Sharkey, supra
note 58, at 423 (“[W]hen it comes to making an implied conflict preemption determination, it is
critical to discern whether the FDA has weighed in on the precise risk the state action likewise seeks
to regulate.”).
65
Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962).
66
Id.
67
During the Bush administration, the FDA, along with other regulatory agencies, took
this position, venturing beyond contained conflict preemption in a series of regulatory preambles.
See generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007). The FDA preamble declares that:
“FDA believes that under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act . . .
preempts conflicting or contrary State law.” Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, at 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006). For
discussion, particularly focused on the FDA, see Sharkey, supra note 30, at 504-05, 511-13. See also
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29.
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reason to think that Congress, in enacting regulatory schemes like the
provision for premarketing review of new prescription drugs, entirely
lost sight of tort as the sole medium for providing victim compensation
when injury occurs after an agency certifies a new product for marketing.
As a consequence, I would read conflict preemption narrowly, confining
it, as previously indicated, to cases in which plaintiff’s claim is based on
agency action grounded in the same evidence-based risk/benefit inquiry
as the tort process would entail.68
Under this narrowly-framed preemption defense, what are the
principal types of tort claims that survive? Most importantly, claims
should survive that are based on substantial new evidence of risk arising
after a product design has been approved if the agency has failed to
weigh in on the new findings in a determinate manner at the time of
product use by the injury victim. I read the Wyeth majority opinion as
consistent with this position: the majority appears to embrace the

The Wyeth majority gave short shrift to the FDA preamble, which had been inserted
into an agency rule without public notice-and-comment, referring to it as “an agency’s mere
assertion that state law is an obstacle to achieving its statutory objectives.” Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at
1201.
68
Like Sugarman, supra note 29, Kessler and Vladeck argue that the compensation goal
should in effect read preemption out of new drug approval cases:
[T]he moment the FDA approves a new drug is the one moment the agency is in the best
position to be the exclusive arbiter of a drug’s safety and effectiveness. On that day, the
FDA has had access to and has devoted considerable resources to reviewing carefully all
of the extant health and safety data relating to the drug. On that day, and that day only,
we agree that the FDA’s determinations about labeling ought not be subject to reexamination by courts or juries in failure-to-warn cases.
Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 465. They attach great weight to the 2007 Amendments to the
FDCA, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007). Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 467-69.
Those provisions give the FDA greater authority to monitor post-approval risks associated with a
drug, and to require labeling changes and safety studies by manufacturers. See id. at nn.23-25 (citing
provisions of the FDCA). At the same time, however, Kessler and Vladeck assert that the
Amendments codify “existing requirements that obligate drug manufacturers to provide up-to-date
safety information to physicians and patients and authorize manufacturers to do so without first
securing the FDA’s approval. The codification of this obligation undercuts the key pro-preemption
argument the FDA and manufacturers make—namely, that the FDA alone decides the content of
drug labels.” Id. at 468-69, (discussing FDAAA tit. IX, § 901(a), 505(o)(4)(I), 121 Stat. 823, 925-26
(2007)).
Contrary to Kessler and Vladeck, Schuck reads the enhanced post-monitoring
authority in the 2007 Amendments to support his case for categorical preemption of tort claims
(apart from misrepresentations to the agency). See Schuck, supra note 6, at 83. It is a matter of
whether one sees the glass as half-full or half-empty.
In contrast to both readings, I regard the Amendments as consistent with my position
in the text. On the one hand, the manufacturer’s obligation to propose labeling revisions in light of
access to new risk information seems germane to allowing a tort claim only so long as the FDA has
failed to act on the information. On the other hand, the FDA’s bolstered authority to monitor and
require labeling changes similarly generates a conflict situation only when the agency has taken
post-approval action in view of the allegedly changed circumstances. Prior to the 2007 Amendments,
post-approval monitoring by the agency was sharply criticized in Institute of Medicine of the
National Academies, The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public
(2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309103035/gifmid/R1.gif, and U.S.
Government Accountability Office, Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in FDA’s Postmarket
Decision-Making and Oversight Process (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf.
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proposition that new risk information, not addressed in determinative
fashion by the agency, provides the foundation for a state tort claim.69
This category of surviving claims is a logical consequence of
containing the comparative institutional competence argument for
regulatory preemption within its own domain. If the tort claim rests on an
assertion that substantial post-approval new evidence of risk has come to
light, and has neither been incorporated into a revised warning, nor
rejected by the agency as insubstantial, the foundational risk/benefit
analysis on which agency certification was based is inapposite. Hence,
the tort claim is not an effort to revisit and supersede the regulatory
approval process.70
A second critical category of surviving claims should be those
grounded in misrepresentations made to the agency in the certification or
post-approval process. Once again, this limitation on the scope of
preemption follows from a purposive analysis of congressional intent.
The agency’s certification process is not duplicated by a tort claim based
on risk/benefit information that should have been provided to the agency
but was not.71 On this score, I subscribe to Peter Schuck’s proposal that
the “disclosure deficit,” as he calls it, lifting the preemption bar, should
not be limited to instances of fraud.72 Like fraudulent misrepresentations
to the agency, instances of innocent or negligent misrepresentation
(including knowing failure to provide material data) undermine the
foundation for preempting tort based on narrowly-conceived conflict
grounds.73

69

See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 at 1197. In fact, as I read the dissenting opinion, there is no
disagreement on this proposition. Rather, the dissent contests that there was new risk information
that compromised the adequacy of the existing label. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1122-25 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
In Riegel, Justice Ginsburg had noted, “The Court’s holding does not reach an
important issue outside the bounds of this case: the preemptive effect of § 360k(a) where evidence of
a medical device’s defect comes to light only after the device receives premarket approval.” Reigel
v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 n.1 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Commentators who advocate broad, “categorical” preemption, as Schuck calls it, see
Schuck, supra note 6, at 102, would make no allowance for new risk information emerging after
regulatory approval. His view rejects victim compensation as a complementary consideration,
characterizing tort exclusively as a contrasting regulatory regime, see id. at 78, 93, a characterization
that in my view is indifferent to congressional intent as the foundation for preemption analysis. See
also Epstein, supra note 23 (advocating blanket preemption for FDA drug approvals based on the
comprehensive regulatory scheme established by Congress).
70
This, of course, says nothing about the merits of the tort claim. At trial, a court might
find the studies methodologically flawed or unpersuasive for any of a variety of reasons. Or the
plaintiff might fail to establish a cause-in-fact relationship between her injury and the product.
71
In this regard, it is critical to note that FDA certifications, like those of other health
and safety regulatory agencies, are based on data supplied by the applicant. See Kessler & Vladeck,
supra note 29, at 491.
72
Schuck, supra note 6, at 102-05.
73
I would also support a threshold requirement that the pleading be with particularity, as
advocated by Schuck, supra note 6, at 105-07; see FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
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Let me trace, in somewhat more detail, the contours of these two
important categories of tort cases that should survive preemption defense
claims grounded in purportedly superseding agency directives.
A.

New Evidence

Two experienced participant/observers, one the former
commissioner of the FDA, put the case for limiting the preclusive effect
of agency directives in perspective:
At the time of approval, the FDA’s knowledge-base may be close to perfect,
but it is also highly limited because, at that point, the drug has been tested on a
relatively small population of patients. Once the drug enters the marketplace,
risks that are relatively rare, that manifest themselves only after an extended
period of time, or that affect vulnerable subpopulations, begin to emerge. These
are often not risks foreseen by the drug’s manufacturer or the FDA and, for that
reason, are not addressed on the label.74

Two recent, highly publicized controversies are illustrative of the
post-approval issues raised by new evidence of risk that need to be
resolved in aligning the domains of regulation and tort. Initially, I will
discuss the scenario in the mass tort litigation arising out of claims that
antidepressant drugs have triggered suicidal reactions.75 Then, I will turn
to the claims of cardiac disease stemming from ingestion of the antiarthritis drug Vioxx.
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,76 involved two consolidated wrongful
death claims by survivors of adults who committed suicide, allegedly as
a consequence of taking antidepressants. Collacicco committed suicide
after beginning a prescribed regimen of ingesting the antidepressant
Paxil; DeAngelis, the other decedent, had ingested Zoloft in the days
before his suicide. Both drugs belong to the class of antidepressants
known as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), which have
triggered major scientific controversy in recent years over whether they
promote suicidal tendencies.77
Paxil bore a warning label deflecting any causal association:
“[t]he possibility of a suicide attempt is inherent in major depressive
disorder and may persist until significant remission occurs.”78 Zoloft bore
a similar warning label, deviating only in referring to “depression” rather
74

Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 29, at 466.
For detailed discussion, see Nagareda, supra note 58, at 25-36.
76
521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, No. 08-437, 2009 WL 578682
(U.S. Mar. 9, 2009).
77
Related controversies involve causal effects in children and adolescents, although that
was not an issue in Colaccico. For discussion of the scientific controversy, see Nagareda, supra note
58, at 26 n.106; Nicholas Bakalar, Suicide Findings Question Link to Antidepressants, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2007 at F7; U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Antidepressant Use in Children,
Adolescents, and Adults, http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/antidepressants/default.htm (last visited Feb.
13, 2009).
78
Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 256.
75
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than “major depressive disorder.”79 The linch-pin for both the tort claims
and the preemption defense was the fact that neither label indicated any
causal relationship between ingestion of the drug and suicidal behavior.
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims of failure to adequately
warn, the Colacicco majority opinion supported granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants by documenting that for more than a
decade before the suicidal incidents occurred, the FDA had consistently
monitored the controversy about the relationship between SSRIs and
adult suicide: denying citizen petitions for labeling change, extending the
existing warning to new disorders, and relying on advisory committee
recommendations.80 The court concluded that there was an ongoing
dialectic, in which the FDA had unwaveringly taken the position that the
defendants’ warning labels were adequate.81
Most critically, in my view, to assessing the significance of this
holding is the court’s insistence that conflict preemption determinations
are case-specific, and its concomitant careful delineation of what was not
being decided:
[W]e need not decide whether preemption would be appropriate under different
facts—such as where the FDA had not rejected the substance of the warning
sought or where the FDA only stated its position after a lawsuit had been
initiated—or under the broader theories of preemption argued by the parties.
Thus, we do not decide whether the FDA’s mere approval of drug labeling is
sufficient to preempt state law claims alleging that the labeling failed to warn
of a given danger, [or] whether FDA approval of drug labeling constitutes
minimum standards in the absence of the FDA’s express rejection of a specific
warning . . . .82

It is these factual scenarios, put aside for another day by the
court, that are critical to defining in further detail the limits of conflict
preemption. In my view, the court has in fact articulated precisely where
the boundaries should be drawn, with each of the prospective scenarios
falling outside the scope of preemption. If the FDA had not rejected the
substance of the proposed warning, had only stated its position after the
onset of the litigation, or had relied on its mere approval of the label,
preemption would be unwarranted, as I see it, because the tort claim
would be raising evidentiary issues on which the FDA had not taken a
determinative position.83
79

Id. at 257.
Id. at 269-70.
81
Id. at 271.
82
Id.
83
The Colacicco opinion, in fact, tips its hand on the “mere approval” question when it
explicitly distinguishes “between the agency’s legal position in its amicus brief and its factual
representations”:
80

The FDA’s summary of its scientific determinations must be distinguished from the
agency’s construction of a statute, as the review of scientific information is strictly within
its expertise. The FDA asserted facts [in this case] in support of its legal position, and we
take notice of its statement of those facts, rather than its legal position.
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By contrast, the Vioxx litigation is illuminating.84 In the early
1990s, Merck began to develop plans for marketing Vioxx, a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID), as research indicated that it
suppressed the pain and inflammation of arthritis sufferers, without
causing the side-effects of gastrointestinal perforations and bleeding
often associated with the competing over-the-counter products already on
the market.85
From the outset, Merck scientists expressed unease about
possible adverse cardiac consequences of the product. But in September
Id. at 270 n.15.
This question has been widely discussed in the context of the FDA preamble on
preemption, see Sharkey, supra note 58, at 421-24, with the focal point being whether the agency’s
assertion of plenary power to preempt under the FDCA should be given Chevron deference or more
limited Skidmore deference. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 468 U.S.
837 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). I see no reason why the agency’s views
on congressional intent should be afforded any weight at all; the FDA has no comparative expertise
advantage over the judiciary when it comes to statutory construction. The Wyeth majority reached a
similar conclusion. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200-01 (2009).
84
For detailed discussion of the history of Vioxx development and regulation, see
McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (NJ Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); Alex Berenson, et al.,
Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1.
The following brief discussion of the Vioxx litigation is based on these sources.
85
A good description of the perceived health benefits of Vioxx is offered in In re Vioxx
Products Liability Litigation, 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570-71 (E.D. La. 2005)):
Vioxx (known generically as rofecoxib) belongs to a general class of pain
relievers known as non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (“NSAIDs”). This class
of drugs contains well-known medications sold either over the counter-such as
Advil (ibuprofen) and Aleve (naproxen)-or by prescription-such as Daypro
(oxaprozin) and Voltaren (diclofenac). NSAIDs work by inhibiting cyclooxygenase
(COX), an enzyme that stimulates synthesis of prostaglandins, which are chemicals
produced in the body that promote certain effects.
Traditional NSAIDs have been a longstanding treatment option for patients
needing relief from chronic or acute inflammation and pain associated with
osteoarthritis. [sic] rheumatoid arthritis, and other musculoskeletal conditions. This
relief, however, comes with significant adverse side effects. Specifically,
traditional NSAIDs greatly increase the risk of gastrointestinal perforations,
ulcers, and bleeds (“PUBs”). This risk is increased when high doses are
ingested, which is often necessary to remedy chronic or acute inflammation and
pain. Scientists estimated that traditional NSAID-induced PUBs caused a
significant number of deaths and hospitalizations each year in the United States.
In the early 1990s, scientists discovered that the COX enzyme had two forms-COX-1
and COX-2-each of which appeared to have several distinct functions. Scientists
believed that COX-1 affected the synthesis or production of prostaglandins
responsible for protection of the stomach lining, whereas COX-2 mediated the
synthesis or production of prostaglandins responsible for pain and inflammation.
This belief led scientists to hypothesize that “selective” NSAIDs designed to
inhibit COX-2, but not COX-1, could offer the same pain relief as traditional
NSAIDs with the reduced risk of fatal or debilitating PUBs. In addition,
scientists believed that such drugs might be able to prove beneficial for the
prevention or treatment of other conditions, such as Alzheimer’s disease and
certain cancers, where evidence suggested that inflammation may play a causative
role.
Id.
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1999, when the FDA approved Vioxx for marketing, there was no
conclusive evidence in that regard. Soon thereafter, however, unsettling
data emerged. In March, 2000, a Merck study of 8,000 rheumatoid
arthritis suffers, the Vigor study, compared the efficacy of Vioxx with
that of a competing traditional NSAID product, Naproxen. Vioxx was
found to be more efficacious than its competitor in reducing the
gastrointestinal side-effects, but patients using it suffered five times as
many heart attacks.
More studies followed and the concerns in the scientific
community mounted, but Merck maintained that the data were
inconclusive: with regard to the Vigor study, for example, Merck argued
that it was the cardiac-protective characteristics of Naproxen rather than
heightened risks of Vioxx that explained the disparity in cardiac events.
In the end, however, Merck voluntarily pulled the product off the market
when Approve, an ongoing 2004 trial of the efficacy of Vioxx in
preventing colon polyps, indicated alarming rates of heart problems in
Vioxx users.
During the four-year post-approval process, Merck reported its
findings (and conclusions) to the FDA; independent scientists weighed
in, often critically; and controversy raged within the agency itself. In
particular, an in-house FDA scientist contended that his assessment of
the Vioxx data, which indicated that Vioxx dramatically increased the
risk of heart disease, was consistently suppressed by his superiors at the
FDA. Most critically, however, throughout this period of agency
monitoring, the FDA never arrived at a firm conclusion on cardiac risks
associated with the product. The agency neither dismissed the growing
evidence, nor on the other hand did it suggest that Merck change its
label.86
As tort suits came to be filed in steadily growing numbers—
exploding in volume after the product was removed from the market
amidst great fanfare—the FDA remained agnostic in its stance on the
cardiac risks posed by Vioxx.87 And concomitantly, the preemption
defense played no substantial role in stemming the tide of lawsuits.88
Nor should it have, in my view. Whether the scientific data, in
fact, supported liability in tort has been hotly contested.89 Legitimate
questions exist as to whether there was substantial new evidence of risk
post-approval, both on the threshold issue of generic risk, and in
86

See supra note 84.
As of November 2004, 1000 plaintiff groups had filed 375 personal injury lawsuits
against Merck, but after Vioxx’s withdrawal from the market, attorneys expected a significant
increase in filings. See Alex Berenson, et al., supra note 84.
88
See, e.g., McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 251 (2008) (rejecting the defense).
89
Of the 18 cases tried to judgment prior to the national settlement, Merck won 13 and
plaintiffs won 5, although some judgments for plaintiffs were later reversed on appeal. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289505#.
87
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individual tort suits brought by users with a spectrum of confounding
cardiac risk factors, as well as a wide range of temporal dose-response
circumstances. But these questions of risk analysis that might serve as
barriers to reanalysis in tort were not issues on which the FDA had taken
a stand. And consequently, the Vioxx litigation provides a nice
counterpoint to the earlier-discussed SSRI tort suits, illuminating the
boundaries of regulatory preemption by sharpening the definition of new
evidence, and keeping the defense narrow in scope.90
B.

Misrepresentations

In Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,91 the Supreme Court came fullcircle back to its initial venture in marking the territorial restrictions on
tort law, the preemption clause in the cigarette labeling act. Reaffirming
its earlier plurality opinion in Cipollone, the Court held that a claim of
fraud—based in Altria on advertising “light” cigarettes as delivering
reduced tar and nicotine—was not preempted by the labeling act’s
preclusion of “requirements” related to smoking and health beyond those
expressly delineated in the statute.92
In a sharp dissent, Justice Thomas, writing for four members of
the Court, twice noted the “theoretical [in]elegance” of carving out a
divide between preempted claims of inadequate warning and nonpreempted claims of fraud.93 But the asserted inelegance of the
distinction is entirely beside the point. There is no theoretical elegance to
statutes such as the federal auto safety act, discussed earlier,94 that
requires tortured reconciliation of a preemption and saving clause, or the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001,95 a benefits scheme
combining internally contradictory tort-centric and social welfare
provisions.96 The interpretive task is to provide a defensible reading to
congressional intent, not to evaluate theoretical elegance.97
90

See Alicia Mundy, FDA May Revise Warning for Antismoking Drug, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 23, 2008, at D3 for discussion of road accidents associated with the antismoking drug Chantix,
another recent example of tort litigation against the backdrop of regulatory inconclusiveness.
91
129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).
92
Id. at 549.
93
Id. at 553, 560 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
94
See discussion of Geier, supra Part II.
95
Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 401, 115 Stat. 237 (2001).
96
For discussion of its main provisions, see Robert L. Rabin, The Quest for Fairness in
Compensating Victims of September 11, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 573, 576-77 (2001).
97
Justice Thomas asserts in that regard that “[t]he text of the statute must control.”
Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 558 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But that is an entirely illusory view; the
foundational reading of “requirements” in Cipollone to include tort suits cannot be found from
textual reading of the preemption clause. It is based on an interpretive gloss—and a highly contested
one at the time. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22. Indeed, in my view, the generally
accepted dichotomy between express and implied preemption is an oversimplification if it is taken to
mean anything more than the difference between statutes that contain a preemption clause and those
that do not. Defining the scope of an “express” preemption clause is always an interpretive matter
(i.e., an exercise in implication).
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In an important sense, the majority view in Altria provides a
salient consideration in defining the scope of regulatory preemption
provisions. The central thrust of Altria is to treat tort claims based on
fraudulent misrepresentations as theoretically distinct from proscribed
claims that would directly challenge the sufficiency of congressionallydetermined upper limits on warning language.98 Fraud is inherently an
exercise in paying lip-service respect to the legislative labeling
directives. Rather than challenging the adequacy of the required warning,
the misrepresentation claim in Altria is premised on defendant creating a
false sense of security that the legislative directive has been satisfied.99
Similarly, in the context of regulatory directives, there is no
reason to conclude that Congress would anticipate sweeping exemption
from tort liability where the claim of industry misconduct is based on a
polluting of the agency process rather than a challenge to its substantive
determinations. For this reason, I would read Buckman narrowly,
containing its reach to stand-alone fraud on the agency claims, as in the
case itself—where the Court concluded that a private right of action
would be inconsistent with the FDA’s self-policing authority.100
IV.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

In the preceding section, the focal point of my discussion was
predominantly the intersection of FDA regulation and the tort system. It
is a natural tack to pursue, both because it is highly topical (and muchdiscussed by the commentators) at this point in time and due to the
FDA’s intrinsic importance as a singularly comprehensive regulatory
In his Wyeth concurrence, Justice Thomas agrees with the holding that plaintiff’s tort
claim is not preempted “[b]ecause implied preemption doctrines . . . wander far from the statutory
text [and hence] are inconsistent with the Constitution.” Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1205
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring).
98
Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 551 (majority opinion).
99
Fraud claims are to preempted inadequate warning claims somewhat as manufacturing
defect claims are to design defect claims: they are deviations from the legislative or regulatory norm
rather than challenges to its adequacy.
100
See Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001) (consultant to a
manufacturer of orthopedic bone screws was alleged to have supplied false information to the FDA
in the product approval process). For detailed discussion of the issue, see Catherine M. Sharkey, The
Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 841 (2008). Sharkey would impose a
primary jurisdiction-type requirement as a prelude to a private tort suit: “Once the FDA has made a
finding of such fraud . . . private litigants should be able to wield such findings offensively to pursue
damages against manufacturers in their state law tort litigation and, where necessary, to disarm
regulatory immunity or preemption.” Id. at 844.
I would not impose any such restriction on state tort law. If the FDA has, in fact,
exercised “primary jurisdiction” then I would, as a matter of course, concur that a tort suit can make
use of the agency finding. But I would also allow a tort suit on grounds of fraud (or other material
misrepresentation) where the agency has made no such finding. Where the agency approval is
materially based on false information, a tort suit is not in conflict with the agency finding under my
constrained definition of conflict; that is, the agency directive was not grounded in the same
evidence-based risk/benefit inquiry as the tort claim because the evidence before the agency was
polluted. It follows, of course, that if the FDA has investigated and rejected the fraud or
misrepresentation allegations, then it would be appropriate to preempt the tort claim.
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authority that nonetheless cannot possibly achieve perfection in
preventing unanticipated injuries.
But my intent in this Article has been to be more allencompassing. In the course of my discussion, I have alluded to a wide
array of regulatory schemes that generate a broad spectrum of agency
directives creating tensions with accident law—tensions that have
crystallized into preemption claims with increasing frequency in recent
years. Whatever the political leaning of the executive branch, there is no
reason to think that sharply disparate views on the appropriate scope of
preemption claims will disappear from the policy arena. In proposing a
framework for addressing these tensions, based on focused examination
of whether the agency directive is grounded in the same evidence-based
risk/benefit inquiry as the tort process would entail, I join those
commentators who seek to forge a path that recognizes the distinct
benefits that both regulation and tort have to offer.

